About the book: 2008 / Retired Colonel David Glanz is a leading American military historian, the largest Western expert on the Red Army and the Great Patriotic War. Knowing the Russian language and Soviet military literature well, and having access to Russian archives, Glantz had the opportunity to work with primary sources, which makes his works certainly worthy of attention. They compare favorably with most works of Western “Sovietologists” by the absence of an “accusatory bias,” anti-communism and Russophobia. This book is recognized as the best study of the circumstances of the 1941 tragedy in Western military-historical literature. D. Glantz reveals the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the border battle, analyzes in detail and in detail its strengths and weaknesses, points out the miscalculations of the Soviet command that predetermined the tragic outcome of the summer campaign of 1941. In his conclusions, Glantz is completely at odds with the “theories” of Viktor Suvorov and others “revisionist” historians, convincingly proving the inconsistency and falsity of their argumentation.