About the book: 2007 / The war could have ended much earlier... The Red Army could have stopped the Wehrmacht back in the summer of 1941. If the Soviet military command had acted in accordance with the real situation, and did not rely on the outdated dogma of beating the enemy “with little blood loss on enemy soil”! A radical turning point in the war could have come as early as 1942. If the available forces and means had been used competently, and not in the way AM Vasilevsky wrote about it: “Hastily the created strike groups consisted, as a rule, of rifle formations weakened in battles. The troops, sent by the Headquarters by rail, arrived slowly and, without completing the concentration, were immediately brought into battle ... "We could have entered Berlin in 1943, at the latest - in 1944. If instead of hundreds of thousands of soldiers' lives, in vain in frontal attacks, the interaction of the military branches would have been clearly worked out in the Red Army. So why did the battles of World War II unfold the way they did? How did it happen that potential victories turned into severe defeats? Who exactly made the responsible decisions and how might events on the battlefields have developed otherwise? Was a different course of battle possible? accordingly, their result? How did one event influence the course of the entire campaign? The author gives non-standard answers to these and other questions, arguing that the entire course of the Patriotic War is a story of lost victories and unused opportunities.